State v. Martinez: The Boundaries of Judicial Discretion and the Sixth Amendment
Right to Trial by Jury in Arizona
[The United States Supreme Court’s] commitment to Apprendi . . . reflects not
just respect for long standing precedent, but the need to give intelligible content to
the right of jury trial. That right is no mere procedural formality, but a
fundamental reservation of power in our constitutional structure. Just as suffrage
ensures the people’s ultimate control in the legislative and executive branches,
jury trial is meant to ensure their control in the judiciary.1
Introduction
How far does a guarantee extend? A satisfaction or your money back guarantee at a
restaurant probably extends to all aspects of the food, but not as far as the service or décor are
concerned. A dry cleaner’s guarantee that your clothes will be ready in two days or your order is
free, is a simple promise that if your clothes are not ready in two days then you will not have to
pay for the cleaning. Black’s Law Dictionary defines a guarantee as “[t]he assurance that a
contract or legal act will be duly carried out.”2 But how far does a constitutional guarantee
extend? Particularly, what is the extent of the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the right to a
speedy and public trial by an impartial jury?3 This guarantee, on its face, appears to give a
criminal defendant the right to have a group of his fellow citizens decide the facts of his case in a
timely manner. Black’s defines a constitutional guarantee as “[a] promise contained in the United
States Constitution that supports or establishes an inalienable right.”4 Does the Sixth Amendment

1

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305-06 (2004).

2

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 723 (8th ed. 2004).

3

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

4

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 331 (8th ed. 2004) (i.e., the right to due process).
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qualify as an inalienable right, and if so, does it extend to all phases of the proceedings, including
those in which the jury has no active role, such as a preliminary hearing or during sentencing?
This Comment will discuss the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the right to a jury trial
and evaluate whether judicial fact finding of aggravators5 during sentencing compromises that
right. Part I will address the Sixth Amendment, applicable federal and state statutes, and
legislative history. This section will address the differences between federal and state sentencing
schemes and will lay the foundation for a discussion of the Sixth Amendment’s application to
state sentencing schemes, particularly Arizona’s presumptive sentencing system.
Part II will address background information and will introduce the United States Supreme
Court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. This section will discuss landmark United States
Supreme Court cases, such as Apprendi v. New Jersey,6 Blakely v. Washington,7 and United
States v. Booker,8 and their impact on state sentencing schemes and the scope of the Sixth

5

Aggravators are facts which, when found by a jury or judge, can increase a defendant’s

punishment beyond the presumptive sentence, so long as the punishment stays within the
permissible range. State v. Alvarez, 205 Ariz. 110, 112 (Ariz. App. 2003). A sentence
enhancement actually elevates the entire range of punishment. Id. Aggravators were historically
classified as either an element of a crime or a sentencing factor. See infra Part II.A. Their
classification as either elements or sentencing factors altered the standard of proof and who was
allowed to do the fact-finding. See infra Part II.A.
6

530 U.S. 466 (2000).

7

542 U.S. 296 (2004).

8

543 U.S. 220 (2005).

Jamie Couche, Page 2 of 66

Amendment. Additionally, this section will address the respective roles of the judge and jury,
along with the difference between elements and sentencing factors.
Part III will analyze the split in the Arizona Court of Appeals and discuss the trouble the
court had in applying Blakely v. Washington.9 Part III will also discuss the resolution of that split
by State v. Martinez10 and State v. Henderson.11 This section of the Comment will evaluate the
aforementioned laws, statutes, and cases with respect to their application in State v. Martinez.12
Part III will also include some speculation as to how State v. Martinez13 will affect Arizona’s
sentencing scheme and cases pending appeal.
Part IV will attempt to resolve any questions presented within this Comment. This section
will also examine bifurcated trials and judicial discretion during sentencing. Lastly, the
Comment will conclude that the Arizona Supreme Court correctly applied United States
Supreme Court precedent in Martinez and that decision will not damage or significantly alter
Arizona’s presumptive sentencing scheme. Arizona’s sentencing scheme is safe because it
permits a judge to exercise her discretion and find aggravating factors during sentencing only
after a jury found the facts legally essential to a defendant’s punishment. Once the jury’s findings
and verdict establish the sentencing range, the Sixth Amendment is satisfied and the judge may
aggravate the sentence, so long as the aggravated sentence remains within the authorized
sentencing range.
9

Blakely, 542 U.S. 296.

10

115 P.3d 618 (Ariz. 2005).

11

115 P.3d 601 (Ariz. 2005).

12

Martinez, 115 P.3d 618.

13

Id.

Jamie Couche, Page 3 of 66

I.

Sentencing Schemes and the Sixth Amendment
The Sixth Amendment rollercoaster has twisted and turned through the federal and state

criminal justice systems and recently clicked its way up a steep track prior to the United States
Supreme Court sending its passengers down a high speed chute with only one eye open. The
recent Supreme Court decisions in Blakely v. Washington14 and United States v. Booker15 will
have a major impact on many state sentencing schemes if those schemes are blocking the tracks
of the Sixth Amendment rollercoaster.
A. The Sixth Amendment
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution states: “[i]n all criminal
proceedings, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed . . . [and] to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation . . . .”16 The purpose of this Amendment to the United
States Constitution was to check the power of a tyrannical State and to protect the accused by
forcing the State to submit all accusations to “the unanimous suffrage of twelve of his equals and
neighbours.”17
“This right was designed to guard against a spirit of oppression and tyranny on the part of
rulers, and was from very early times insisted on by our ancestors in the parent country, as the
14

Blakely, 542 U.S. 296.

15

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).

16

U.S. CONST. amend. VI; For Arizona’s statutory provision for the right to a jury trial and the

rights of accused, see ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 24. Arizona’s declaration of rights of the accused is
parallel to and provides protection equal to the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
17

See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301 (quoting William Blackstone, 4 Commentaries *343).
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bulwark of their civil and political liberties.”18 The Founding Fathers expressed their interest in
protecting trial proceedings from state corruption and arbitrary accusations and punishment
resulting from judicial despotism.19 Both sides of the convention agreed to establish such a
protection.20
The friends and adversaries of the plan of the convention, if they agree in nothing
else, concur at least in the value they set upon the trial by jury; or if there is any
difference between them it consists in this: the former regard it as a valuable
safeguard to liberty; the latter represent it as the very palladium of free
government.21
The Sixth Amendment enshrined these concerns of both friends and adversaries of the
Constitution and established the fundamental right to trial by jury.22
The United States Supreme Court described the Sixth Amendment in criminal cases as
“fundamental to the American scheme of justice, and therefore applicable in state
proceedings.”23 The Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment24 incorporates the Sixth

18

United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510-11 (1995); see also Glasser v. United States, 315

U.S. 60, 84 (1942) (“Since it was first recognized in Magna Carta, trial by jury has been a prized
shield against oppression. . . . Our Constitution transforms that privilege into a right in criminal
proceedings in a federal court.”).
19

See THE FEDERALIST NO. 83 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).

20

See id.

21

Id.

22

See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; THE FEDERALIST NO. 83 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter

ed., 1961).
23

Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277 (1993).
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Amendment25 in state proceedings and constitutionally “protects the accused against conviction
except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which he is charged.”26 Although there is not much disagreement over the Sixth Amendment’s
application to state criminal proceedings, the scope of the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee is the
source of much controversy and debate. This Comment will attempt to resolve some of the
controversy inherent in sentencing schemes that permit judicial fact finding, particularly of
aggravators, and will examine whether such fact-finding falls within the scope of the Sixth
Amendment.
B. Federal and State Sentencing Schemes
1. The Federal System and the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
In order to guide a judge in his determination of an appropriate sentence and maintain
some uniformity and proportionality in sentencing, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act

24

See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. “No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or

property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.” Id. at § 1.
25

See Mills v. Singletary, 63 F.3d 999, 1009 (11th Cir. 1995); see also Pyles v. Johnson, 136

F.3d 986, 992 (5th Cir. 1998) (stating that the Sixth Amendment is “enforceable against the
states as a result of incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause [and]
implies at the very least that the evidence developed against a defendant shall come . . . in a
public courtroom where there is full judicial protection of the defendant’s right[s] . . . .”);
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277 (1993).
26

United States v. Rogers, 94 F.3d 1519, 1524 (11th Cir. 1996).
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of 1984 (“the Act”).27 The United States Sentencing Commission (‘the Commission”), under
authority of 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (1984), was responsible for compiling the sentencing
guidelines.28 The Commission possessed broad authority to review and hopefully rationalize the
federal sentencing process.29 In the Commission’s enabling act, Congress instructed them to
“create categories of offense behavior and offender characteristics” and to prescribe sentencing
guidelines based on the combination of those categories.30 The Commission’s “principal purpose
27

See Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 211-38, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (sub-section of The Comprehensive

Crime Control Act of 1984); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.1 (2004); for a brief
historical overview leading up to the Act, see generally Susan R. Klein, The Return of Federal
Judicial Discretion in Criminal Sentencing, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 693 (2005) (discussing the
evolution of America’s sentencing from an indeterminate system, in which the judge had
ultimate discretion as “master of his courtroom,” to sentencing reform and ultimately United
States v. Booker, which made the Act only advisory).
28

See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.1 (2004). The Act established the

Commission as an “independent agency in the Judicial Branch, and directed it to develop
guidelines and policy statements for sentencing courts to use when sentencing offenders
convicted of federal crimes.” Id.
29

Id.

30

Id. An offense behavior category could be “bank robbery/committed with a gun/$2500 taken”

and an offender characteristic could be “offender with one prior conviction who was not
sentenced to imprisonment.” Id. This combination of categories would expose the defendant to
seventy-eight to ninety-seven months of imprisonment. See id. (calculated range found in § 5A
and based on offense levels set forth in §§ 2B3.1, 4A1.1).
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[was] to establish sentencing policies and practices for the federal criminal justice system that
[would] assure the ends of justice by promulgating detailed guidelines prescribing the
appropriate sentences for convicted offenders of federal crimes.”31
The Act required judges to consider the guidelines’ sentencing range and then establish
“the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant, pertinent
[to] sentencing commission policy statements, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing
disparities, and the need to provide restitution to victims.”32 The guidelines were intended to help
judges impose sentences that were sufficient, but not greater than necessary, and to comply with
the overall purposes of the Act.33 According to 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a)(2), the purposes of the Act
were:
to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to
provide just punishment for the offense; to afford adequate deterrence to criminal
conduct; to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and to provide
the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or
other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.34
The United States Supreme Court recently interpreted the federal guidelines as advisory
and not mandatory.35 Federal judges are now supposed to consider the guidelines in conjunction
31

Id.

32

Marcia G. Shein, United States v. Booker: Where Are We Now?, 52 FED. LAW. 22, 23 (May

2005).
33

18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (2) (West 2003).

34

Id.

35

18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3551-3553; see United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 221 (2005). The Court

declared that the “mandatory nature” of the guidelines – particularly 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3553(b)(1)
and 3742(e) – was unconstitutional and the Court severed those portions from the Act. The result
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with the goals of sentencing in order to establish an appropriate sentence within the guideline
range.36 If a federal judge departs from the guideline range and imposes a mitigated or
aggravated sentence, then he must specify his reasons for the departure.37 Although the
Commission’s categories should cover all possible combinations of crimes and criminal
behavior, discretionary departures are permitted because rigid adherence to the guidelines is not
mandatory or feasible in all cases.38 Any departure from the recommended guideline range must
be justified by the judge’s specific findings and reasons for imposing the deviant sentence.39 On

made the “Guidelines effectively advisory, requiring a sentencing court to consider the
Guidelines ranges, but permitting it to tailor the sentence in light of other statutory concerns.”
Booker, 543 U.S. at 221; see infra Part II.C.3.
36

See Booker, 543 U.S. at 221; Shein supra note 32, at 23.

37

See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553 (b); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.1 (2004).

Judicial discretion was not one of the goals Congress wanted the Commission to further through
the guidelines. Congress’ intent was to make sentences uniform and proportional and to basically
prevent judges from having any sentencing discretion that could jeopardize their goals. U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.1 (2004)
38

See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.1 (2004) (“The list of potentially relevant

features of criminal behavior is long; the fact that they can occur in multiple combinations means
that the list of possible permutations of factors is virtually endless.”). Additionally, United States
v. Booker made the guidelines only advisory and officially condoned some departures. Booker,
543 U.S. at 221.
39

See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.1 (2004); Shein supra, note 32 at 23.
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appeal, the judge’s justification for the departure will be reviewed under a reasonableness
standard.40
2. State Sentencing Schemes
While the Federal sentencing guidelines were recently interpreted as advisory,41 state
sentencing schemes vary across the country in both form and application.42 Similar to their
federal counterparts, many states share the goals of increasing sentencing uniformity and limiting
judicial sentencing discretion.43 In order to achieve their goals, states either created commissions
to establish their own guidelines or enacted guidelines through legislative action.44
40

See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.1 (2004); 18 U.S.C.A. § 3742. See infra

Part III.B for a discussion on Blakely-error and the standard of review applicable to alleged Sixth
Amendment violations.
41

See Booker, 543 U.S. at 221; infra Part II.C.3.

42

John Wool & Don Stemen, 17 FED. SENTENCING REP. 60, 2004 WL 2566156, at *3-4 (Vera.

Inst. Just.) (2004).
43

See Ben Trachtenberg, State Sentencing Policy and New Prison Admission, 38 U. MICH. J.L.

REFORM 479, 486 (2005). Although there was little uniformity at first, “[t]hrough mandatory
minimums, sentencing guidelines, and other policies, each jurisdiction has limited judicial
discretion in sentencing.” Id. See also, Michael Limrick, Senate Bill 96: How General Assembly
Returned Problem of Uniform Sentencing to Indiana’s Appellate Courts, 49-FEB Res Gestae 18
*18 (2006).
44

See Trachtenberg supra note 43, at 487-88. All states enforced a mandatory minimum sentence

for some crimes by 1996 and about half used guidelines similar to the federal system. Id.
Mandatory minimum sentences were created for habitual offenders (two strikes and you are out
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One variation of sentencing reform, used in ten states, is a voluntary guidelines system.45
Under a voluntary guidelines system, the legislature or commission establishes a range of
sentences for each offense; however, the sentencing guidelines do not bind the judge.46 In
roughly half the voluntary systems, the judge is encouraged to use the guidelines, but may
impose an aggravated sentence outside the guidelines range. The judge may do so, even without
any additional fact finding, so long as the sentence remains within the statutory maximum.47
Additionally, if a judge departs from the recommended guidelines, he need not provide any
justification for doing so.48

laws), drunk driving, crimes of possession of a deadly weapon (use a gun--go to prison laws),
and drug possession and distribution crimes. See Bureau of Justice Assistance, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, NCJ 169270, 1996 National Survey of State Sentencing Structures 29 (1998).
45

Wool & Stemen supra note 42, at *5-6. Arkansas, Delaware, the District of Columbia,

Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri, Rhode Island, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin all use voluntary
sentencing systems. Id.
46

Id. at *3-4.

47

Id. at *4-6. The District of Colombia, Louisiana, Missouri, and Wisconsin all fall under the

judge-encouraged voluntary guidelines category and base the statutory maximum either on the
defendant’s plea or on the jury’s verdict. See id. The United States Supreme Court specifically
curtailed judicial discretion under voluntary guideline schemes in the landmark decision of
Apprendi v. New Jersey. 530 U.S. 466 (2000); see infra Part II.C.1.
48

See Wool & Stemen supra note 42, at *4-6. These state systems do not violate the Sixth

Amendment because they require the judge to confine his sentence, even when it is an
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Voluntary guidelines systems differ over whether the judge must provide any justification
for a departure. In the remaining six voluntary guidelines states, the judge must first apply the
discretionary guidelines, but may impose an enhanced sentence thereafter.49 Depending on the
degree of departure, each of these state systems requires the judge to specify his findings and
reasons for departing from the guidelines’ range.50 In these voluntary guideline states, a
departure signifies an enhanced sentence based on circumstances or facts found by the judge and
not admitted by the defendant or based on the jury’s verdict.51
A variation of the presumptive sentencing guidelines system, employed by five states,
requires a judge to impose the presumptive or recommended sentence and provide justification
for departing from the recommended sentencing range.52 Under this system, the guidelines set
forth a range for the offense, with the maximum based on the jury’s verdict or defendant’s guilty
plea.53 Only when a judge finds aggravating factors, can he impose an “enhanced” or
unexplained aggravated sentence, to the statutory maximum based on the jury’s verdict or
defendant’s guilty plea. See id.
49

Id. at *5-6. Arkansas, Delaware, Maryland, Rhode Island, Utah, and Virginia all fall under the

justification-required voluntary guidelines category. See id. at *4-6.
50

See id. at *5-6.

51

Id. at *6-7.

52

Id. at *2-3. Kansas, Minnesota, North Carolina, Oregon, and Tennessee employ presumptive

sentence guidelines systems. Id. These systems are likely in Constitutional jeopardy, as they are
similar to Washington’s system recently ruled unconstitutional by the United States Supreme
Court in Blakely v. Washington. See 542 U.S. 296 (2004); see infra Part II.C.2.
53

Wool & Stemen supra note 42, at *2-3.
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“exceptional” sentence above the maximum range.54 States that employ presumptive sentencing
guidelines systems are in constitutional jeopardy because under those systems, the judge, not the
jury, is responsible for finding aggravating circumstances. The United States Supreme Court
recently ruled that that practice violates the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury.55
Arizona, along with seven other states, does not have formal guidelines, but instead
employs a determinate sentencing or presumptive sentencing system.56 States with presumptive
sentencing systems enact statutes that have a presumptive sentence or range of sentences for each

54

Id. at *2-4. These states’ guidelines systems differ in only minor ways, however they all share

judicial fact finding for sentence aggravation beyond the standard range, and that is where they
conflict with the Sixth Amendment. See id.
55

See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); But see Wool & Stemen supra note 42, at

*4-5 (“Kansas’s system is not generally implicated by Blakely because it has amended its
statutes to require that a jury find any fact that forms the basis of an enhanced sentence.”)
56

See Wool & Stemen supra note 42, at *4-5 (Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Indiana,

New Jersey, New Mexico, and Ohio all have similar non-guideline systems). Indiana’s scheme
sets forth a fixed term with upper and lower boundaries, however the maximum permissible
sentence absent aggravators was Indiana’s fixed or presumptive term. IND. CODE. ANN. §§ 3550-2-3, -38-1-7.1 (West 2004). Only after the judge considers and finds aggravating factors can
she impose an upward departure from the fixed term. Id. The judge has to identify the factors,
specify her findings and reasons, and articulate the factors and balancing she did to determine an
upward departure is warranted. See id.; Trowbridge v. State, 717 N.E.2d 138, 149 (Ind. 1999).
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class of crime.57 The sentencing judge is required to impose a sentence within the presumptive
range and can only impose a higher sentence after a finding of aggravating factors.58
Under Arizona’s system, judges must follow the presumptive sentence range associated
with a crime and if they deviate from the presumptive sentence, they must provide justifications
on the record for their departure.59 In order for the judge to impose an aggravated sentence, at
least one aggravating circumstance must be found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt,

57

See Wool & Stemen supra note 42, at *4-5.

58

Id.

59

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-702 (Supp. 2000), amended by ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-702

(2005):
Sentences provided in § 13-701 for a first conviction of a felony, except those
felonies involving the discharge, use or threatening exhibition of a deadly weapon
or dangerous instrument or the intentional or knowing infliction of serious
physical injury upon another or if a specific sentence is otherwise provided, may
be increased or reduced by the court within the ranges set by this subsection. . . .
The upper or lower term[s] . . . may be imposed only if one or more of the
circumstances alleged to be in aggravation of the crime are found to be true by the
trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt, or in mitigation of the crime are found to
be true by the trial judge, on any evidence or information introduced or submitted
to the court or the trier of fact before sentencing or any evidence presented at trial,
and factual findings and reasons in support of such findings are set forth on the
record at the time of sentencing. . . . If the trier of fact finds at least one
aggravating circumstance, the trial court may find by a preponderance of the
evidence additional aggravating circumstances. In determining what sentence to
impose, the court shall take into account the amount of aggravating circumstances
and whether the amount of mitigating circumstances is sufficiently substantial to
call for the lesser term. If the trier of fact finds aggravating circumstances and the
court does not find any mitigating circumstances, the court shall impose an
aggravated sentence.
.
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admitted by the defendant, or be a prior felony conviction.60 Once the jury finds at least one
aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt, Arizona’s sentencing statutes basically open the door for
the judge to find additional aggravators under the preponderance of the evidence standard and
then impose an aggravated sentence. 61 The judge may find facts under a lower standard of proof
because the jury already found the particular facts necessary to constitute the crime with which
the defendant was charged and to sustain the sentencing range. Thus, the Sixth Amendment right
to jury trial was constitutionally satisfied and the defendant’s right to jury fact finding does not
control additional fact-finding during sentencing.62
Most state schemes share a common goal of promoting uniformity and proportionality
according to the offense and the circumstances surrounding the offense.63 In theory, they also
serve a deterrent purpose similar to the federal system because they classify characteristics of
both the offense and the circumstances, which provides notice and creates a system that punishes

60

Id. Although the jury must find aggravators beyond a reasonable doubt, a judge may find

mitigating circumstances based on any evidence or information presented at trial or submitted to
the court. Id.; see infra Part III.B.
61

Id. Once the jury “finds at least one aggravating circumstance, the trial court may find by a

preponderance of the evidence additional aggravating circumstances.” Id.; see infra Parts III.B.III.C.
62

See infra text accompanying notes 125, 170; infra note 180.

63

See Shein supra note 32, at 23; Wool & Stemen supra note 42, at *10-11.
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as advertised.64 However, some of the systems may not properly apply Constitutional principles,
and those schemes are at risk of being mauled by the Sixth Amendment rollercoaster.
II.

The Tracks Laid Down by the United States Supreme Court
A. Elements v. Sentencing Factors: What Impact and Who Decides?
The classification of facts as elements of a crime as opposed to sentencing factors is a

point of controversy among scholars, attorneys, and judges.65 Simply put, the controversy
revolves around whether the judge or the jury is the fact finder and which burden of proof is
applicable.66
“The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that prosecutors prove,
beyond a reasonable doubt, every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which a defendant is

64

See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305-07 (2004); 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(B)

(West 2003) (considering just punishment and adequate deterrence to criminal conduct as factors
used in drafting sentencing schemes).
65

See generally, Catherine M. Guastello, The Tail That Wags the Dog: The Evolution of

Elements, Sentencing Factors, and the Functional Equivalent of Elements – Why Aggravating
Factors Need To Be Charged in the Indictment, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 199 (2005) (discussing the
historical debate over sentencing factors versus elements of a crime and the impact of Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986)).
66

See John M. Parese, Putting The Tail Between The Dog’s Legs: The Danger of Apprendi v.

New Jersey, 21 QUINNIPAC. L. REV. 645, 648-50 (2002); Guastello supra note 65, at 199-203.
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charged. Elements, however, are what make up an offense, not sentencing factors.”67 While
elements of a crime undoubtedly merit proof beyond a reasonable doubt, sentencing factors
historically did not carry the same weight.68
A distinction, often debated in respect to evidence, is whether the determination of
sentencing factors is a question of law or one of fact. According to the Federal Rules of
Evidence, the judge decides questions of law, while the jury determines questions of fact.69 Thus,
a prosecutor must prove all questions of fact to the jury in order for them to influence the final
verdict and eventual punishment.
However, with regard to aggravating factors, the fact-law line often blurs because “not all
facts are equally susceptible to jury determination.”70 Occasionally a judge may find sentencing
factors, while other times the judge must determine certain factors because submitting them to a
jury would be unfairly prejudicial or would demand an overexertion of impartiality on behalf of
the jury.71 For example, “aggravating factors that compare the defendant to other defendants or
67

Parese supra note 66, at 648-49. A prosecutor must charge all elements of a crime in the

indictment, try each element before a jury, and the jury must find each element beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id.
68

U.S. Const. amend VI; see United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 230 (2005); State v.

Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 511 (1995); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
69

See FED. R. EVID. 104.

70

Wool & Stemen supra note 42, at *4-5.

71

See Booker, 543 U.S. at 230-33. Once a jury finds one aggravating factor or the defendant has

a prior conviction or admits to an aggravator, the judge may find additional aggravating factors
in determining an appropriate sentence within an established range. See infra Parts II.B-II.C.

Jamie Couche, Page 17 of 66

circumstances of the offense to the circumstances in other offenses charged under the same
statute would be extremely difficult for jurors to decide.”72 Such a comparison at first glance
appears to be a fact question and should be submitted to the jury, however the comparison
implicates both law and policy, which a judge may be more adept at evaluating.
If a sentencing factor is not an element of the crime charged in the indictment,73 then
need it be submitted to the jury to protect the defendant’s procedural rights guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment?74 If so, how much will this additional safeguard burden the criminal justice
system and should that burden even be a consideration?75 The following section addresses the
United States Supreme Court’s resolution of the factor-element debate.
B. The Twists and Turns Constructed by the United States Supreme Court
1. Pre-Apprendi v. New Jersey76
72

Wool & Stemen supra note 42, at *4-5. It is doubtful that juries have sufficient background to

determine whether an aggravated sentence is necessary to protect the public from a hate crime
defendant or whether a presumptive term will suffice. Id. If juries are required to make such
determinations, then trial proceedings will be further extended to encompass a grandiose
sentencing hearing involving expert witnesses, rather than simple pre-sentencing reports. See id.
73

See Booker, 543 U.S. at 228 (Not only must the State submit all accusations to a jury, but the

State must also prove beyond a reasonable doubt, every fact necessary to constitute the crime
charged in the indictment).
74

See infra Part II.B for discussion on Supreme Court decisions resolving the element-factor

controversy, particularly in respect to aggravating facts and circumstances.
75

See infra Part IV.

76

530 U.S. 466 (2000).
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The United States Supreme Court tug-of-war with the guarantees of the Sixth
Amendment and the constitutional distinction between elements of a crime and sentencing
factors has left many Sixth Amendment rollercoaster passengers spinning and uneasy. Prior to
Apprendi v. New Jersey,77 the Court addressed this distinction in three significant five-to-four
vote cases which each added its own twist to the analysis.
2. McMillan v. Pennsylvania78
In McMillan v. Pennsylvania,79 the United States Supreme Court addressed a mandatory
minimum sentencing scheme and a judge’s upward departure from that scheme.80 The jury found
the defendant guilty of aggravated assault and possession of an instrument of a crime,81 which
garnered respective sentencing ranges of three to ten years and two and a half to five years to be
served concurrently.82 In McMillan, the trial judge found, based on the preponderance of the
evidence, that the defendant visibly possessed a firearm and thereafter she increased the
minimum sentence from three to five years imprisonment.83
77

Id.

78

477 U.S. 79 (1986) (affixing the label of a “sentencing factor” to a fact not found by the jury

and recognizing that it could affect the sentence imposed by a judge).
79

Id.

80

Id. at 81-82.

81

18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2503 (1982).

82

McMillan, 477 U.S. at 82-83.

83

Id. at 81, 83. Pennsylvania’s mandatory minimum sentencing scheme divested the judge of

any discretion and required him to aggravate the sentence to no less than five years once he
found the visible possession aggravator. See id.
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The Court examined Pennsylvania’s legislative intent and determined that the legislature
deliberately chose not to include “visible possession” as an element of the crime, but rather as a
sentencing factor to be determined after the jury returned a guilty verdict.84 Relying on Patterson
v. New York,85 the Court concluded that Pennsylvania need not prove beyond a reasonable doubt
every fact influencing the severity of the punishment.86 Thus, for the first time, the Court
distinguished facts designated as ‘sentencing factors’ from elements of a crime and specified that
sentencing factors do not merit equivalent constitutional protection.
3. Almendarez-Torres v. United States87

84

See id. at 83-87 (explaining that the legislature specifically distinguished between elements

and sentencing factors).
85

432 U.S. 197 (1977) (rejecting the notion that whenever a State links the “severity of

punishment” to the “presence or absence of an identified fact” the state must prove that fact
beyond a reasonable doubt).
86

See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 83-84. The McMillan Court based its reasoning on

Patterson, stating:
Patterson stressed that in determining what facts must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt the state legislature’s definition of the elements of the offense is
usually dispositive: [T]he Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements included in the definition of the
offense of which the defendant is charged. While there are obviously
constitutional limits beyond which the States may not go in this regard, [t]he
applicability of the reasonable-doubt standard ... has always been dependent on
how a State defines the offense that is charged in any given case.
Id. (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted).
87

Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
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The next time the Court confronted the factor-element issue was in Almendarez-Torres v.
United States, in which the defendant was a deported alien convicted of returning to the United
States without permission, which warranted a maximum sentence of two years.88 The sentencing
judge increased the maximum sentence from two to twenty years, based on the defendant’s
admission that his three prior aggravated felony convictions lead to his earlier deportation.89 The
Court affirmed the sentence, stressing that Congress intended recidivism to be an aggravating
sentencing factor, and held that the Constitution did not require recidivism to be classified as an
element of the crime, nor included in the indictment.90
The Almendarez-Torres decision established that there was no right to a jury trial, nor
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, for a prior conviction accusation, even when that factor
drastically increases the maximum possible sentence.91 This decision plays a controversial role in
the factor-element debate and serves as a hairpin turn on the Sixth Amendment rollercoaster
because it exempted prior convictions from a second round of jury fact-finding and authorized
judges to consider prior convictions during sentencing.
4. Jones v. United States92
88

See id. at 226-27; 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a), (b)(2) (1994).

89

Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 226-27.

90

See id.; Michelle Reiss Drab, Constitutional Law: Fact or Factor: The Supreme Court

Eliminates Sentencing Factors and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 57 FLA. L. REV. 987, 990
(2005).
91

See Wool & Stemen supra note 42, at *7.

92

Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999) (addressing the application of the Sixth

Amendment jury trial requirement to the determination of aggravating factors).
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In a final major pre-Apprendi case and in an effort to clarify another facet of the factorelement debate, the Court addressed Jones v. United States. In Jones, the Court considered a
federal carjacking statute with three separate maximum sentences that were dependent on the
severity of harm suffered by the victim.93 The base maximum sentence was fifteen years, the
intermediate level increased to twenty-five years if serious bodily harm resulted, and the third
level was life imprisonment if death resulted.94 The defendant was charged with carjacking in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1) and faced a maximum sentence of fifteen years
imprisonment.95 However, the judge sentenced the defendant to twenty-five years after finding
that one victim suffered serious bodily injury after the defendant jammed his gun in the victim’s
ear, perforating his eardrum and causing some permanent hearing loss.96
The Court acknowledged, “[m]uch turns on the determination that a fact is an element of
an offense rather than a sentencing consideration, given that elements must be charged in the
indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven by the Government beyond a reasonable doubt.”97 In
the federal statute, the “extent of the harm” provisions appeared to be a sentencing factor and
only relevant to punishment; however the Court concluded that they were actually elements of
three distinct crimes.98

93

See id. at 229-30; 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1996).

94

18 U.S.C. § 2119.

95

See Jones, 526 U.S. 227; 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1) (1996).

96

See Jones, 526 U.S. at 229-31.

97

Id. at 232.

98

Id. at 229.
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While we think the fairest reading of § 2119 treats the fact of serious bodily harm as
an element, not a mere enhancement, we recognize the possibility of the other view.
Any doubt that might be prompted by the arguments for that other reading should,
however, be resolved against it under the rule repeatedly affirmed, that ‘where a
statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful
constitutional questions arise and by the other of which questions are avoided, our
duty is to adopt the other.’99
Thus, the Court chose to limit the judge’s interpretation of the sentencing statute, prohibit
the use of alleged sentencing factors that raise the punishment beyond the statutory
maximum based on the facts charged in the indictment, and require the government to
prove such facts to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.100
C. Apprendi and its Progeny
1. Apprendi v. New Jersey101
The following year, in Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Court strengthened the stance
it took in Jones when it held that the prosecution must submit to the jury and prove

99

Id. at 239 (quoting United States ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213

U.S. 366, 408 (1909)).
100

See id. (requiring jury determinations of facts that raise a sentencing ceiling in state and

federal sentencing guidelines systems). The Court further noted that:
under the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial
guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than a prior conviction) that
increase the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment,
submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at 243.
101

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).

Jamie Couche, Page 23 of 66

beyond a reasonable doubt any fact other than a prior conviction, which increases a
penalty beyond the statutorily prescribed maximum.102
The police arrested the defendant after he fired several .22-caliber shots into the home of
an African-American family who had just moved into a previously all-white neighborhood.103 In
Apprendi, the defendant was charged with a weapons violation and pled guilty to two counts of
second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose and one count of third-degree
unlawful possession of an anti-personnel bomb.104

102

Id. at 490.
This rule reflects two longstanding tenets of common-law jurisprudence: that the
‘truth of every accusation’ against a defendant ‘should afterwards be confirmed
by the unanimous suffrage of twelve of his equals and neighbors,’ and that ‘an
accusation which lacks any particular fact which the law makes essential to the
punishment is no accusation within the requirements of the common law, and it is
no accusation in reason.

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 300 (2004) (quoting 4. W. Blackstone,
Commentaries on the Laws of England 343 (1769); 1 J. Bishop, Criminal Procedure § 87,
at 55 (2d ed. 1872)).
103

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469.

104

Id. at 469-70. Under New Jersey sentencing statutes, a second-degree offense carries a five to

ten year penalty range and a third-degree offense carries a three to five year penalty range. Id. at
470 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6(a)(2)-(3) (West 1999)).
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After the judge accepted the guilty plea, she held an evidentiary hearing to decide
the issue of the defendant’s “purpose” for the shooting.105 The defendant offered
character evidence through expert testimony and several character witnesses, in an
attempt to prove that he had no reputation for racial bias.106 However, the sentencing
judge found the police officer’s testimony was more credible and concluded that the
crime was motivated by racial bias.107 The judge then sentenced the defendant to an
aggravated sentence of twelve years, based on judicial findings by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant’s actions were committed with the purpose to intimidate and
thus triggered New Jersey’s hate crime enhancement.108 The New Jersey Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court’s ruling even though it exposed the defendant to greater and
additional punishment.109
The Court disagreed with the sentencing judge and the New Jersey Supreme
Court and found that a defendant charged with a weapons violation was entitled to have a
105

Id. at 470-71. The statute classified a purpose to intimidate as an aggravator, when it is based

on race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation, or ethnicity. N.J. REV. STAT. §
2C:44-3(e) (1999).
106

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 470-71.

107

Id. at 471. Apprendi made a statement to the police, later retracted, that he did not know the

occupants of the house, but “because they are black in color he does not want them in the
neighborhood.” Id. at 469.
108

Id. at 471 (discussing the appellate court’s interpretation of the hate crime enhancement as a

sentencing factor, rather than an element of a crime, based on New Jersey legislative history).
109

See 731 A.2d 485 (1999).
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jury decide whether a hate crime enhancement was applicable.110 As a matter of
procedure, the Court declared that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments “indisputably
entitle a criminal defendant to a ‘jury determination that he is guilty of every element of
the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.’”111 These constitutional
protections extend to aggravating circumstances that potentially increase the maximum
range of punishment beyond that which a defendant would receive if punished solely on
properly found facts reflected in the jury’s verdict.112
These restrictions on judicial discretion are important for uniformity and
proportionality in sentencing, but even more crucially, they provide notice as to the
maximum punishment possible under the facts charged in the indictment.113 In Apprendi,
the defendant was punished as if he violated a first-degree offense, which violated his
Sixth Amendment protections because the facts charged in the indictment only exposed
the defendant to punishment for a second-degree offense. Such a practice, based solely on
judicial fact-finding of aggravating circumstances, which enhanced a sentence beyond the

110

See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 471-72.

111

Id. at 476-78 (citing State v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995)).

112

See id. at 480-84. When judges use their discretion in imposing a sentence, they are

restricted by statutory limits and by a jury’s verdict, when available. Id. at 481-84.
113

See id. at 483 (explaining that the indictment allows a defendant to discern the maximum

possible punishment under a particular statute and that the judge’s role is restricted by the facts
charged in the indictment and found by a jury).
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prescribed statutory maximum, could not stand because it violated the defendant’s rights
under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.114
In Apprendi, the New Jersey statute defined the hate crime enhancement as a
sentencing factor, which required a finding of a “purpose to intimidate.”115 Such a query,
probing a “defendant’s intent in committing a crime, is perhaps as close as one might
hope to come to a core criminal offense ‘element.’”116 However, New Jersey’s
classification of this fact as a sentencing factor instead of an element should not be
evaluated on a form basis, but rather on an effect basis. The question that must be asked

114

See id. at 490-92. The constitutional conflict falls squarely on the fact that the only

aggravating factor was found by the judge and not by the jury. Id. at 491-92. Furthermore, the
Court reiterated that States do not have unbound authority to define facts as either elements of a
crime or sentencing factors, particularly when those classifications expose a defendant to an
aggravated sentence. Rather, the States are checked by constitutional principles that constrict
their ability to create sentencing schemes that remove facts from the jury that could enhance a
sentence beyond that authorized by a jury’s verdict. See id. at 486; McMillan v. Pennsylvania,
477 U.S. 79, 85-88 (1986).
115

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 491-93 (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6(a)(1) (West

1999)) The inquiry into a “purpose to intimidate” is a question of motive, which requires an
evaluation of the defendant’s mental state, and it is a question that should be reserved for the
jury. See id.
116

Id. at 493.
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is, does the required finding expose the defendant to a greater punishment than that
authorized by either the defendant’s plea agreement or the jury’s guilty verdict?117
2. Blakely v. Washington118
Four years later in Blakely v. Washington,119 the Court addressed that question
posed in Apprendi.120 The Court found that Washington’s determinate sentencing
guidelines system violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment jury right because it gave
judges, rather than juries, the authority to make factual determinations necessary to

117

Id. at 494. “When the term ‘sentencing enhancement’ is used to describe an increase beyond

the maximum authorized statutory sentence, it is the functional equivalent of an element of a
greater offense than the one authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict.” Id. In Apprendi, the
aggravated sentence enhanced the crime’s punishment from second to first-degree, based on
judicial fact-finding beyond facts admitted by defendant in his plea agreement. Id. How New
Jersey classified a “purpose to intimidate” is irrelevant because the effect of the finding on
Apprendi’s punishment was that it aggravated the authorized sentencing range. Id. Such an
enhancement has not only a nominal effect on Apprendi’s sentence, but additionally increases
the severity of the stigma attached to a higher sentence, both of which should be constitutionally
curtailed by restricting judicial fact finding. See id. at 494-95 (also comparing this classification
to the “tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense” as described in McMillan v.
Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 88 (1986)).
118

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).

119

Id.

120

See supra note 117.
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aggravate sentences.121 In Blakely, the defendant pled guilty to second degree kidnapping
involving domestic violence and the use of a firearm.122 Based on the facts of the
defendant’s plea, he was subject to a statutory maximum sentence of fifty-three months,
however, the judge found the defendant acted with “deliberate cruelty” and enhanced the
sentence to ninety months.123
Washington’s scheme allowed the judge to impose an enhanced sentence beyond
the guidelines’ range, only after finding a statutorily enumerated aggravating factor and
setting forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting his decision.124 After
granting certiorari, the Court clarified the rule established by Apprendi, stating that the
“statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may
impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the
defendant.”125 Any departure from the statutory maximum is an abuse of discretion
121

Blakely, 542 U.S. at 299-300.

122

Id. at 298-99.

123

Id. at 298; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.390 (West 2000) (providing an illustrative, but

not exhaustive list of statutorily enumerated grounds for departure based on aggravating
circumstances).
124

Blakely, 542 U.S. at 299-300; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.120(2) (West 2000)

(permitting a judge to impose a sentence beyond the standard range if he finds “substantial and
compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence”).
125

Blakely, 542 U.S. at 299-300 (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis in the original).

The statutory maximum is established prior to any additional judicial fact finding. It is
the maximum the judge may impose without any additional findings. Id. In Blakely, the
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because the jury has not found all facts legally essential to justify the punishment and the
judge has thus exceeded his proper authority.126
In Blakely, the judge’s abuse of discretion by enhancing the sentence beyond the
statutory maximum, while permissible under Washington’s sentencing scheme, was a
violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment jury right because it exposed him to
greater punishment than that authorized by his plea agreement.127 The Court held that the
Washington sentencing scheme did not comply with the Sixth Amendment and the
defendant’s enhanced sentence was therefore invalid.128
3. United States v. Booker129

maximum range for a second-degree kidnapping, a class B Felony, is forty-nine to fiftythree months. Id.; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.320 (West 2000).
126

Blakely, 542 U.S. at 299-300 (discussing 1 J. Bishop, Criminal Procedure § 87, at 55 (2d ed.

1872)).
127

Id. at 303-04. Had defendant opted for a jury trial rather than a plea, then a jury would have

had to find beyond a reasonable doubt all the facts legally essential to his punishment. Id. at 30305.
128

Id. at 305.

129

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). The Court granted certiorari for Booker and

combined it with United States v. Fanfan, a similar case in which Fanfan was convicted by a jury
of possession with intent to distribute 500 or more grams of cocaine, an offense garnering a
sentence of seventy-eight months according to the Guidelines. Id. at 228. However, contrary to
Booker, when the judge found additional aggravating factors that enhanced Fanfan’s sentence to
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The Court’s most recent major Sixth Amendment decision came in January of
2005, where the Court applied Apprendi and its progeny to the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines (“the Guidelines”).130 In United States v. Booker,131 a jury convicted the
defendant of possession with intent to distribute at least fifty grams of crack cocaine,132
an offense carrying a sentence range of 210 to 262 months imprisonment according to the
Guidelines.133
During the sentencing hearing, the judge found, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the defendant possessed an additional 566 grams of crack cocaine and was
guilty of obstructing justice.134 The judge’s additional findings, according to the
Guidelines, exposed the defendant to a sentence of 360 months to life imprisonment.135
Based on the judge-found aggravating factors, the defendant received the 360-month

188 to 235 months, the judge adhered to the teachings of Blakely and refused to depart from the
jury’s verdict. Id.
130

See supra Part I.B.1.

131

543 U.S. 220 (2005).

132

Id. at 227 (finding beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant possessed ninety-two and one-

half grams of crack cocaine); see 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1999).
133

Booker, 543 U.S. at 227; see U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, §§ 2D1.1(c)(4), 4A1.1

(Nov. 2003).
134

Booker, 543 U.S. at 227.

135

Id.
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minimum enhanced sentence, 98 months greater than the maximum established by the
jury’s verdict.136
The Court, applying Apprendi and its progeny, held that “any fact other than a
prior conviction which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum
authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted
by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”137 Additionally, the
Court severed and excised the provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act that made the
Guidelines mandatory138 because they were incompatible with the Apprendi progeny.139
Following Booker, the Guidelines are only advisory, but judges can still discretionarily
use them to determine an appropriate sentence based on a particular set of facts and
circumstances.140
III.

Application of the United States Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence to Arizona’s
Sentencing Practices
The aforementioned cases are the backbone of the United States Supreme Court’s

Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. Apart from Booker, nearly all the cases dealt with state
sentencing schemes and served to clarify what the Sixth Amendment currently guarantees

136

Id.

137

Id. at 244.

138

18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (Supp. 2004).

139

Booker, 543 U.S. at 242-46.

140

Id. at 245-46. See supra note 129, for a leading example, although pre-Booker, of a judge

adhering to his oath to uphold the Constitution and recognizing that the mandatory nature of the
Guidelines is not feasible when it violates a defendant’s Sixth Amendment jury right.
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in state proceedings. However, the Court’s jurisprudence is not always fluidly applied in
state proceedings and can occasionally encounter resistance and confusion.141 The
Arizona Court of Appeals split over how to interpret Blakely and how to apply it to
Arizona’s presumptive sentencing system. State v. Martinez142 and State v. Munninger143
embodied the competing schools of thought within the Arizona Court of Appeals.
A. Arizona’s Blakely Split
1. State v. Martinez144
The Arizona Court of Appeals is just one of several state courts that struggled with their
application of the Apprendi progeny, particularly Blakely v. Washington.145 A series of

141

Compare State v. Estrada, 108 P.3d 261, 262 (Ariz. App. 2005), and State v. Martinez, 100

P.3d 30, 31-32 (Ariz. App. 2004), with State v. Munninger, 104 P.3d 204 (Ariz. App. 2005), and
State v. Alire, 105 P.3d 163, 166-67 (Ariz. App. 2005); see infra Part III.A. For another state’s
trouble with Apprendi/Blakely, see also Traylor v. State, 817 N.E.2d 611, 622 (Ind. App. Ct.
2004); Strong v. State, 817 N.E.2d 256, 261 (Ind. App. Ct. 2004); Krebs v. State, 816 N.E.2d
469, 475-76 (Ind. App. Ct. 2004).
142

Martinez, 100 P.3d 30.

143

Munninger, 104 P.3d 204.

144

Martinez, 100 P.3d 30.

145

542 U.S. 296 (2004).
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conflicting decisions demonstrated the split in the Arizona Court of Appeals over how to
interpret Blakely.146
In State v. Martinez (“Martinez I”),147 the jury convicted the defendant of first-degree
murder of his sixty nine-year-old landlord, second degree burglary, and theft of a means of
transportation.148 After the jury found the defendant guilty on all counts charged, the jury found
that the state failed to prove the aggravating circumstances that the murder was committed for
pecuniary gain or in an especially cruel, heinous, or depraved manner.149 However, the judge
imposed a natural life sentence for the murder conviction and consecutive sentences of seven
years each for the burglary and theft convictions.150 The defendant contested all three sentences
146

Compare Munninger, 104 P.3d 204, and Alire, 105 P.3d 163, with Martinez, 100 P.3d 30, and

Estrada, 108 P.3d at 262 (“Our difference of opinion on how to apply Blakely is one on which
reasonable minds can, and obviously do, differ”) (Kessler, J., dissenting).
147

Martinez, 100 P.3d 30.

148

Id. at 32. Defendant admitted to having an accomplice and killing victim and was charged

with first-degree murder for causing victim’s death with premeditation. Id. The second-degree
burglary charge stemmed from entering and remaining in victim’s residence with the intent to
commit a felony or theft. Id. Theft of a means of transportation was charged because the
defendant controlled the victim’s truck with the intent to permanently deprive her of its use. Id.
149

Id.

150

Id. at 32-33. A person convicted of first-degree murder may receive a sentence of death,

natural life without the possibility of parole, or life in prison with the possibility of parole after
twenty-five years. Id. The jury did not find aggravators that would make defendant death
eligible, so the judge imposed the presumptive natural life sentence. Id. at 33 (discussing ARIZ.
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and claimed that the court violated Blakely because it imposed aggravated rather than
presumptive sentences and did so based on judge-found aggravators.151
According to Arizona’s sentencing scheme, the judge “must impose the presumptive
sentence unless ‘circumstances alleged to be in aggravation or mitigation of the crime are found
to be true.’”152 Arizona’s presumptive sentencing scheme153 set forth the sentencing range for
first-degree murder and declared natural life as the presumptive sentence.154 In Martinez I, the
judge merely increased the natural life sentence within the statutory range155 and did not use
judge-found sentencing factors to enhance the sentence beyond that range.156 The court
concluded that this manner of imposing a sentence based on aggravating factors did not violate

REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(A) (2000)). Both the burglary and theft convictions were class three
felonies, each carrying a three and one-half year presumptive sentence. Id. at 34; see ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1507(B), -1814(C), -701(C)(2) (Supp. 2000).
151

Martinez, 100 P.3d at 32-33 (defendant failed to object to these claims at trial, so they are

waived absent fundamental error).
152

Id. at 34 (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-702(B) (2000)). The judge is required to

impose the presumptive sentence, not the minimum sentence, if no mitigators or aggravators are
present. Id.
153

See supra Part I.B.2.

154

Martinez, 100 P.3d at 33; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(A) (2000).

155

Martinez, 100 P.3d at 33-34.

156

Id.
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Blakely because the sentence remained within the confines of the established statutory maximum
authorized by the jury’s verdict.157
Because a guilty verdict for first-degree murder authorizes the court to impose a
life sentence either with or without the possibility of release, the court may
properly consider the statutory sentencing factors, without the need for jury
findings regarding those factors, in deciding whether to allow the possibility of
release.158
Therefore, in Martinez I the court did not violate Blakely when it properly sentenced the
defendant to an aggravated presumptive sentence of natural life imprisonment for first-degree
murder.
However, the major debate in Martinez I was not in regards to whether defendant should
be eligible for release, but rather whether his aggravated sentences for burglary and theft violated
Blakely.159 The sentencing ranges applicable to burglary and theft are a minimum of two and a
half years, a presumptive term of three and one-half years, and a maximum of seven years.160
After finding eight aggravating factors, the judge sentenced the defendant to two consecutive
seven-year sentences.161

157

Id. at 33.

158

Id. at 34.

159

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 299-300 (2004).

160

Martinez, 100 P.3d at 34. Both the burglary and theft convictions were class three felonies,

each carrying a three and one-half year presumptive sentence. Id.; see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
13-1507(B), -1814(C), -701(C)(2) (2000); supra note 150.
161

Martinez, 100 P.3d at 34. The trial court found in aggravation:
(1) the presence of an accomplice, (2) the use of a knife as a weapon, (3) the
severe injuries and death of the victim, (4) the emotional and physical pain
suffered by the victim, (5) the emotional and financial harm to the victim’s
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The judge was authorized to find additional aggravating factors because implicit in the
jury’s verdict was the aggravating factor that the victim died.162 “[T]he jury having found the
existence of one aggravating factor, its verdict expanded the sentencing range and the scope of
the trial court’s sentencing discretion. When one aggravating factor is authorized by the jury,
Blakely is satisfied”163 because “the facts ‘legally essential to the punishment’ have been
found.”164 Thereafter, the judge may use his discretion in imposing an aggravated sentence.165
The procedural facts of Martinez I are distinguishable from Blakely and Apprendi
because in neither of those cases was an aggravating factor found by the jury, implicitly or
otherwise.166 In fact, Martinez I appears to fit perfectly within the Supreme Court’s Sixth

family, (6) the brutal nature of the crime, (7) pecuniary gain, and (8) the victim’s
age.
Id.; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-702(C) (Supp. 2000).
162

Martinez, 100 P.3d at 34; see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-702(B), -702(C)(9) (Supp. 2000).

163

Martinez, 100 P.3d at 34; see Washington, 542 U.S. at 302-03.

164

Martinez, 100 P.3d at 34-35 (quoting Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 313 (2004)).

165

Id.

166

Id. In Blakely, the defendant pled guilty to second-degree kidnapping involving domestic

abuse and use of a firearm. Based solely on judicial fact-finding that defendant acted with
deliberate cruelty, the judge imposed an enhanced sentence, thirty-seven months beyond the
statutory permissible range. See Washington, 542 U.S. 296. In Apprendi, the defendant pled
guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm for unlawful purpose and unlawful possession of a
prohibited weapon. After the judge found in aggravation that defendant acted with purpose to

Jamie Couche, Page 37 of 66

Amendment jurisprudence because the sentences remained within the permissible range
authorized by the jury’s verdict.167 Additionally, “Arizona’s non-capital felony sentencing
provisions have accommodated a scheme where some factual determinations which increase a
defendant’s sentence are found by the jury while others are found by the judge, with the ultimate
sentencing decision made by the latter.”168 Arizona’s presumptive sentencing scheme, as applied
in Martinez I, does not appear to violate the Sixth Amendment’s jury right guarantee because an
Arizona judge may only impose an aggravated sentence after a jury’s verdict or a defendant’s
admission authorizes her to do so.169 Thus, the jury’s verdict satisfied the constitutional aspect of
sentencing because they found the facts legally essential to the defendant’s punishment, which
allowed the judge to exercise her sentencing discretion within the established sentencing
range.170

intimidate based on race, the judge imposed an enhanced sentence that doubled the defendant’s
range of punishment. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
167

Martinez, 100 P.3d at 34-35 (implicit finding by jury, that victim of burglary and theft was

killed by defendant, authorized sentences of up to seven years per charge).
168

Id. at 35 (discussing State v. Beasley, 205 Ariz. 334, 341 (Ariz. App. 2003)); ARIZ. REV.

STAT. ANN. § 13-702 (Supp. 2000), amended by ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-702 (2005)
(emphasis in original).
169

See Martinez, 100 P.3d at 35; Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 226-27

(1998) (finding of prior conviction also need not be submitted to jury and is sufficient to open
the door to aggravated sentencing).
170

See infra note 180 for jury findings supporting the verdict and aggravated sentence.
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2. State v. Munninger171
While Martinez I appeared to properly interpret the Supreme Court’s Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence, subsequent decisions by the Arizona Court of Appeals demonstrated that the
Apprendi progeny was not entirely clear.172 State v. Munninger173 was the epitome of the
opposing interpretive view of Blakely. In Munninger,174 the defendant was charged and
convicted of aggravated assault and the jury, by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, properly found
that the offense was dangerous.175 The permissible sentencing range was a minimum of five
years, a presumptive term of seven and one-half years, and a maximum of fifteen years.176
The judge imposed a twelve and one-half year aggravated sentence, which the appeals
court characterized as an enhanced sentence.177 Extraordinary suffering and severity of harm to

171

104 P.3d 204 (Ariz. App. 2005).

172

See supra note 141.

173

Munninger, 104 P.3d 204.

174

Id. The defendant encountered the victim outside of a bar late at night, approached the victim,

and stabbed the victim under the left armpit with a sharp instrument. Id. at 207. The victim’s
artery, major nerves, veins, and lymph nodes were severed; resulting in an inability to control the
use of his left arm or hand. Id. at 207-08.
175

Id. at 207-08. Dangerousness is an aggravating factor that increases the presumptive sentence

to seven and one-half years for aggravated assault, a class three dangerous felony. Id. at 207;
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-604(I) (Supp. 2004).
176

Munninger, 104 P.3d at 207-08; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-604(I) (Supp. 2004).

177

Munninger, 104 P.3d at 208; see supra note 2.
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the victim was the primary aggravator supported by overwhelming evidence.178 However, the
trial judge additionally found that the defendant’s actions were committed viciously and that the
defendant used a dangerous instrument or deadly weapon.179 The appeals court held that an
enhanced sentence based on a single properly found aggravating factor violated Blakely because
the sentence rested on additional aggravating factors not found by the jury.180 Munninger
recognized that the right to jury trial is only violated when a factor increases the sentence beyond
that authorized by the jury’s verdict and stated that any punishment beyond the presumptive
sentence requires jury fact finding.181

178

Munninger, 104 P.3d at 215. The superior court stated:
The victim was hospitalized for weeks. He nearly died. He's undergone . . . at
least 15 surgeries already. His pain is enormous. His suffering is enormous, and it
will continue for the rest of his life. His left arm is paralyzed. He continues
physical therapy. He came very close to dying in this case.

Id.
179

Id. at 215-16; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-702(C)(2), (5), (9) (Supp. 2000).

180

Munninger, 104 P.3d at 210; see State v. Ring, 65 P.3d 915, 943 (2003). While criticizing

Martinez I, the Munninger court rejected the State’s argument that,
any error was harmless because only one aggravating factor need be properly
found. . . . [I]f one such factor is present, the imposition of an aggravated sentence
is for the judge’s discretion. The judge may then consider additional aggravating
circumstances even if they were not found by a jury. In other words . . . a single
aggravating factor confers sentencing discretion upon the judge anywhere within
the range of the presumptive sentence to the maximum sentence, and additional
aggravating factors may be determined by the judge alone.
Munninger, 104 P.3d at 210; see also State v. Martinez, 100 P.3d 30 (Ariz. App. 2004).
181

Munninger, 104 P.3d at 211-12.
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The Munninger court attacked Martinez I on the grounds that the implicit finding of death
solely supported the sentence and that the additional judge-found aggravators violated Blakely.182
A single aggravating factor may make a defendant “eligible” for an aggravated sentence,
however a jury must still “consider all aggravating factors urged by the state and not either
exempt from Ring II, implicit in the jury’s verdict, or otherwise established beyond a reasonable
doubt.”183
Munninger also declared that the Supreme Court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence does
not differentiate between capital and non-capital sentencing with respect to aggravators and that
all factors used to aggravate a sentence must be submitted to the jury.184 The reasoning behind
the Munninger court’s interpretation of the Apprendi progeny rests two-fold on “the
constitutional requirement that the jury decide beyond a reasonable doubt all elements of the
offense, and the absence of any real ‘distinction between elements and sentencing factors.’”185

182

Id. at 210-11.

183

Id. (emphasis in original). Ring II is Ring v. Arizona, in which the Supreme Court found

Arizona’s sentencing scheme permissibly rendered a defendant death eligible upon a single
finding of an aggravator. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
184

Munninger, 104 P.3d at 211 (discussing Apprendi, Blakely, and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S.

584 (2002)). “Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond
a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 210-11 (emphasis in original) (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466, 490 (2000)).
185

Id. at 212 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.466 , 494 (2000)).
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Furthermore, “[t]he difference between a judicial finding and a jury finding is no mere
procedural formality, but a fundamental reservation of power in our constitutional structure.”186
The Munninger court stressed the need for the jury to consider all facts and statutorily
enumerated aggravators and mitigators before the judge may use her discretion in sentencing.187
Prior to the judge’s imposition of punishment based on aggravating factors, the jury must find
not one, but all facts that can be used to increase the punishment.188 Only after the jury makes
those findings may the judge exercise her discretion, otherwise the judge unconstitutionally
abuses her discretion because her authority derives “wholly” from the jury’s findings.189 Thus,
the trial judge in Munninger abused her authority because she imposed a sentence based on two
additional aggravators not found by the jury, which was a violation of the defendant’s Due
Process and Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury.190
As discussed above, Munninger prohibits sentencing based on aggravating factors when
the jury found only one aggravator.191 Additionally, Munninger requires that the jury must find
all aggravators considered during sentencing.192 This interpretation of the United States Supreme
186

Id. (emphasis added).

187

Id. at 211-13.

188

Id. at 214 (explaining that “the horse must precede the carriage”).

189

Munninger, 104 P.3d at 214 (quoting Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306 (2004)).

“Without that restriction, the jury would not exercise the control that the Framers intended.”
Washington, 542 U.S. at 306.
190

U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI; Munninger, 104 P.3d at 216-17.

191

Munninger, 104 P.3d at 210.

192

Id.
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Court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence directly conflicts with Martinez I and the two views
cannot stand together.
B. The Resolution
On July 8, 2005, the Arizona Supreme Court issued two opinions that temporarily
resolved the controversy over the application of Blakely to sentencing in Arizona.193 The eagerly
anticipated decisions of State v. Martinez (“Martinez II”)194 and State v. Henderson195 were
enthusiastically welcomed by a few appeals court judges who wrestled with the rest of the court
over how to interpret Blakely.196
In Martinez II, the defendant claimed that the trial judge found facts legally essential for
the aggravated sentences for burglary and theft and that those findings and consecutive
aggravated sentences violated Blakely.197 The defendant asserted that the jury must find beyond a
reasonable doubt all facts legally essential to his punishment.198 Additionally, he insisted that
193

The resolution was temporary because as more cases come out, more light will be shed on

Blakely’s application and the interpretation will continue to be tweaked within Arizona.
194

115 P.3d 618 (Ariz. 2005).

195

115 P.3d 601 (Ariz. 2005).

196

Only five of the twenty-two court of appeals’ judges interpreted Blakely as did the Arizona

Supreme Court. Judges Thompson, Hall, Barker, Timmer, and Espinoza led the way. See
generally State v. Estrada, 108 P.3d 261, (Ariz. App. 2005); State v. Martinez, 100 P.3d 30
(Ariz. App. 2004); State v. Henderson 100 P.3d 911 (Ariz. App. 2004).
197

Martinez, 115 P.3d at 624 (defendant does not contest his sentence of natural life for the

murder conviction).
198

Id.; see supra Part III.A.2.
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Arizona Revised Statutes section 13-702(A) required the court to conduct a balancing test
between all aggravating and mitigating circumstances prior to imposing an aggravated
sentence.199
However, the judge-found facts did not violate Blakely because those aggravating factors
did not expose the defendant to a punishment unauthorized by the jury’s verdict.200 “[I]n a noncapital context, a jury need find only that fact or those facts that are ‘legally essential’ to expose
a defendant to a particular range.”201 Under Arizona’s sentence scheme, once such a finding is
made, the judge may sentence the defendant to the maximum punishment available under the
applicable statute.202 Additionally, the imposition of consecutive sentences for the burglary and
theft did not violate Blakely and were well within the court’s discretion.203
199

Martinez, 115 P.3d at 623; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-702 (Supp. 2000), amended by ARIZ.

REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-702(A) (2005).
200

Martinez, 115 P.3d at 624; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-702 (Supp. 2000), amended by ARIZ.

REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-702(A) (2005).
201

Martinez, 115 P.3d at 624 (quoting United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) and Blakely

v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004)). Arizona’s non-capital sentencing scheme conflicts with the
capital scheme because the capital fact-finding role is solely in the hands of the jury. A capital
jury decides aggravating and mitigating factors and determines whether a death sentence is
appropriate, whereas a non-capital judge may find aggravators once authorized to do so. See
State v. Ring, 65 P.3d 915, 926 (Ariz. 2003); Martinez, 115 P.3d at 625. See supra note 184 for
conflicting interpretation by the Munninger court.
202

See Martinez, 115 P.3d at 624; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-702 (Supp. 2000), amended by

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-702 (2005).
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In opposition to the Munninger line of thinking, the court clarified that the jury need not
find all potential aggravating facts.204 The role of the fact-finder is not a unique position in a noncapital jury trial, but rather shared between the jury and the judge.205 The distinction between the
two fact-finders lies in the timing of the fact-finding. The jury is required to find at least one
aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt before the judge may find additional aggravating
factors by a preponderance of the evidence.206

203

See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) (under the Double Jeopardy

Clause of the United States Constitution, consecutive sentences are permissible only if each
crime requires proof of at least one additional fact that the other does not); People v. Black, 113
P.3d 534 (Cal. 2005) (Blakely applies to a single conviction and not to consecutive sentencing, so
the court’s choice to impose consecutive sentences is within its discretion).
204

See Martinez, 115 P.3d at 621, 624; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-702 (Supp. 2000), amended

by ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-702 (2005); see also State v. Johnson, 111 P.3d 1038, 1041
(Ariz. App. 2005) (judicial fact-finding will not violate Blakely if the ultimate sentence does not
exceed the maximum authorized by the jury verdict alone).
205

Martinez, 115 P.3d at 625. “Arizona’s non-capital sentencing statutes provide no indication

that the legislature intended to vest responsibility for finding all aggravating facts in a single
factfinder.” Id. Defendants do not have a right to jury findings of fact to in sentencing, but rather
only in establishing the facts legally essential for a range of punishment. McMillan v.
Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 93 (1986).
206

Id. A judge may also find aggravating factors after the defendant admits to certain facts or has

prior convictions. Id.
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If the jury fails to find aggravating factors that authorize an aggravated sentence, then the
judge may not enhance the sentence.207Furthermore, if a judge does enhance the sentence, the
sentence will be invalid because it rests on judge-found facts that operate as the “functional
equivalent of an element.”208 Long enshrined in this country’s legal history is the need for the
prosecutor to prove all elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.209 Anything less is a
violation of the defendant’s procedural rights under both the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.210
Thus, Martinez complied with the Apprendi progeny because the jury, and not the judge,
implicitly found the initial aggravating factor.211 Once the jury found that the defendant
murdered his sixty-nine year old landlord, the door was open for the judge to find additional
aggravating factors and to impose an aggravated sentence within the authorized statutory
range.212 The murder conviction and implicit jury finding of death constitutionally satisfied the
Sixth Amendment because the facts legally essential to support the sentencing range were
established and the judge could then use her discretion to aggravate the sentences to the
maximum punishment within that range.213
207

See supra notes 111-112 and accompanying text.

208

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 n.19 (2000); see supra Part II.A.

209

See supra Part I.A.

210

U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI; see Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000); In re

Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970); State v. Ring, 204 Ariz. 534, 545 (2003).
211

See supra text accompanying note 162.

212

See supra text accompanying notes 125, 163-165.

213

See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 481 (once all facts legally essential to the punishment are

established, judges may exercise discretion in sentencing within statutory limits); State v.
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However, had the judge abused her discretion and improperly found aggravators without
the jury’s authorization, then the appeals court would have had to review Martinez for Blakely
error. In order to determine whether there was a violation of a defendant’s procedural rights, the
reviewing court will look for either trial error or structural error. In Arizona, State v.
Henderson214 established the error-analysis for Blakely as trial error and not structural error.215
Structural errors “‘deprive defendants of basic protections without which a criminal trial cannot
reliably serve its function as a vehicle for guilt or innocence.’”216 Not only do structural errors
deprive defendants of their constitutional rights, but they also “taint ‘the framework within which
the trial proceeds.’”217 Blakely error does not permeate the entire trial, but rather is simply an
error in a portion of the trial process.218

Griswold, 422 P.2d 693, 694 (1967) (sentencing is a matter of judicial discretion and is only
reviewable for an abuse of discretion).
214

State v. Henderson, 115 P.3d 601, 607 (Ariz. 2005) (Henderson satisfied his burden of

persuasion and convinced the court that fundamental error occurred and that it caused him
prejudice at sentencing).
215

Id. at 604-05.

216

Id. at 605 (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1999)).

217

State v. Anderson, 197 Ariz. 314, 323 (2000) (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279,

307-08 (1991)).
218

See Henderson, 115 P.3d at 606.
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Blakely error is trial error and can be either harmless or fundamental.219 The two types of
trial error differ on whether or not there was an objection at trial.220 If there was an objection,
then harmless error analysis applies because the defendant preserved that issue for appeal.221 On
the other hand, a failure to object at trial results in a waiver of that issue and a forfeiture of the
right to obtain appellate relief absent fundamental error.222 Only in rare cases will an appellate
court disregard a forfeiture because the error is so severe that it “takes from a defendant a right
essential to his defense” and is “of such magnitude that the defendant could not possibly have
received a fair trial.”223
When a reviewing court conducts harmless error review, the burden is on the state to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not influence the verdict or the sentence.224
On the other hand, the burden of persuasion is on the defendant to prove that fundamental error
occurred.225 The burden switches with fundamental error because the defendant had the
219

Id. at 604 (facts admitted by a defendant or implicit in the jury’s verdict will fall outside the

scope of Blakely error).
220

Id. at 604-05.

221

Id.

222

Id. at 607. Although a failure to object at trial is a forfeiture of the right to appeal that issue,

the Arizona Appeals Court ignored that waiver in Martinez and reviewed the sentencing
procedure for fundamental error because Blakely v. Washington was not decided at the time of
the trial. See State v. Martinez, 100 P.3d 30, 33 (Ariz. App. 2004); Henderson, 115 P.3d at 607.
223

Henderson, 115 P.3d at 607.

224

Id.; State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 588 (Ariz. 1993).

225

Henderson, 115 P.3d at 607.
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opportunity to preserve his rights at trial and failed to do so. Thus, his ability to obtain relief is
limited in order to “discourage a defendant from ‘taking his chances on a favorable verdict,
reserving the [w]hole card of a later appeal on a matter that was curable at trial, and then seeking
appellate reversal.’”226
If a defendant successfully proves that fundamental error occurred, he must next
demonstrate that the error caused him prejudice in the trial or at sentencing.227 The inquiry into
prejudice is fact-intensive and varies from case to case.228 The prejudice must violate the
defendant’s procedural rights for the reviewing court to overturn the sentence.229 When the
alleged error is a deprivation of an inalienable right such as Fifth Amendment due process or the
Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury, the defendant “must show that a reasonable jury,
applying the appropriate standard of proof, could have reached a different result than did the trial
judge” in respect to any or all aggravators.230 If a defendant satisfies this additional burden, then
the reviewing court must decide whether there are sufficient facts to support the defendant’s
aggravated sentence.231 A lack of recorded factual support for the aggravated sentence signifies
an adequate showing of prejudice.232
226

Id. (quoting State v. Valdez, 160 Ariz. 9, 13-14 (Ariz. 1989)).

227

Id. at 608-09.

228

Id. at 608.

229

See id. (stating that the sentencing procedure denied the defendant the right to have certain

facts decided by a jury and that such a procedure constituted fundamental error because it went
to the foundation of the defendant’s case).
230

Henderson, 115 P.3d at 609.

231

Id.
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Applying this Blakely trial error analysis to Henderson, the defendant was sentenced in
violation of Blakely, however, he failed to object at trial and therefore, fundamental error review
was appropriate.233 In Henderson, the state conceded that Blakely error occurred because the
judge did find facts by a preponderance of the evidence and used those findings to impose an
aggravated sentence, and both constituted fundamental error.234 Additionally, the Blakely error
caused the defendant prejudice because it exposed him to a sentence beyond which the jury’s
unlawful imprisonment verdict authorized.235 The jury failed to find the defendant intended to
inflict serious bodily injury upon his victim, which was the only element distinguishing unlawful
imprisonment from kidnapping.236 However, after the trial judge made several additional
findings, she sentenced the defendant to an aggravated term equivalent to kidnapping.237
Therefore, in Henderson, the judge’s additional findings prejudiced the defendant because it
exposed him to a sentence unauthorized by the jury’s verdict and was a violation of his
inalienable Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury.
While the defendant in Henderson was prejudiced by fundamental error, Martinez did not
involve fundamental error, nor would the defendant in Martinez have been able to prove any
232

Id.

233

Id. at 604, 608. (Henderson’s trial concluded prior to the Blakely decision).

234

Id. at 608.

235

Id. at 609.

236

Henderson, 115 P.3d at 609; ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 13-1304 (kidnapping), -1303 (unlawful

imprisonment), -1304.A.3 (requiring intent to inflict serious injury upon the victim) (2004).
237

Henderson, 115 P.3d at 609-10 (Henderson mirrors the fact pattern and procedural error of

Blakely and warrants the same result).
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prejudice occurred.238 Assuming, just for argument, that fundamental error did occur in Martinez,
no reasonable jury would fail to find that the murder victim suffered serious physical injury or
was over the age of sixty-five.239 Additionally, it is unquestionable that the victim died and the
record contained sufficient findings of facts to sustain the aggravated sentences.240 Therefore, in
Martinez the defendant’s procedural rights were not violated, no fundamental error or prejudice
occurred, and the trial and aggravated sentences complied with Blakely.
C. State v. Martinez’ Impact on Arizona’s Sentencing Scheme
Arizona’s presumptive sentencing scheme is not in constitutional jeopardy according to the
Arizona Supreme Court’s decision in Martinez II. This is partly due to expeditious amendments
made by the Arizona State legislature to Arizona’s sentencing provisions shortly after the United
States Supreme Court decided Blakely.241 The amendments clarified who the aggravating factfinder had to be in capital and non-capital cases and stated what factors are Blakely-exempt and
which must comply with Blakely.242
238

See State v. Martinez, 115 P.3d 618, 620 (Ariz. 2005). The appeals court reviewed the

sentencing procedure for fundamental error, found none, and affirmed the sentences holding that
they complied with Blakely and the Sixth Amendment. Id.
239

Id. at 619-20; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-702 (C)(9), (13) ((Supp. 2000), amended by ARIZ.

REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-702 (C)(9), (13) (2005).
240

See supra note 161.

241

Martinez, 115 P.3d at 625 (noting legislature amended sections 13-702 and 13-702.01 to

comply with Blakely).
242

State v. Lamar, 115 P.3d 611, 617 (Ariz. 2005). A Blakely-exempt factor, such as a prior

conviction, authorizes the judge to impose an aggravated sentence within the established
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Although Arizona’s sentencing scheme has a sentencing range with presumptive,
mitigated, and aggravated sentencing possibilities, the scheme is distinguishable from
Washington’s fixed-term scheme invalidated by Blakely.243 Unlike Washington’s invalidated
presumptive guidelines scheme, Arizona’s scheme requires the jury to find the initial aggravating
factors.244 Once a Blakely-compliant or -exempt factor is found, the judge may then exercise her
discretion in imposing an aggravated sentence within the prescribed statutory range.245 Blakelycompliant factors include facts found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt,246 facts inherent in
the jury’s verdict,247 and admissions by the defendant.248 In other words, Blakely-compliant facts
are those that are properly found or admitted as true by a defendant. Blakely-exempt factors
statutory range. Id.; see also ARIZ. REV STAT. ANN. § 13-702 (Supp. 2000), amended by ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-702 (2005).
243

See supra Part I.B.2.

244

See supra notes 55, 59.

245

See supra text accompanying note 61; State v. Urquidez, 2006 WL 233431 *4 (Ariz. App.

2006); Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, State v. Moon, 2005 WL 3606079 *7 (Colo. 2005) (“an
extraordinary circumstance that accompanies a Blakely-compliant or -exempt circumstance only
affects the choice of sentence within the prescribed statutory range as widened by the Blakelycompliant or exempt fact”).
246

State v. Aleman, 109 P.3d 571, 581 (Ariz. App. 2005) (citing State v. Oaks, 104 P.3d 163,

168 (Ariz. App. 2004)).
247

State v. Ruggiero, 120 P.3d 690, 696 (Ariz. App. 2005); State v. Martinez, 115 P.3d 618

(Ariz. 2005).
248

Aleman, 109 P.3d at 581.
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include prior convictions249 and a defendant’s parole status,250 either of which only needs to be
supported by reasonable evidence in the record.251 While a Blakely-exemption usually only
applies to felony convictions, misdemeanor convictions can also be Blakely-exempt if previously
secured in a Sixth Amendment-compliant manner.252 Additionally, Blakely-exempt factors are
sufficient to uphold an aggravated sentence even if a reasonable jury failed to find other
aggravating factors.253 Thus, under Arizona’s scheme, an increase from the presumptive to the
maximum sentence within the authorized statutory range does not violate the Sixth Amendment,
so long as a Blakely-compliant or -exempt factor is present.254

249

State v. Burdick, 125 P.3d 1039, 1042 (Ariz. App. 2005) (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530

U.S. 466, 490 (2000) and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004)); State v. Carreon,
107 P.3d 900, 911 (Ariz. 2005) (prior conviction burden is met when prosecutor offered into
evidence a certified copy of defendant’s conviction and established that defendant was the
person convicted) (citing State v. Marlow, 786 P.2d 395, 400 (1989)).
250

Carreon, 107 P.3d at 911-13 (parole status burden is met when prosecution offered into

evidence the document establishing defendant’s release status and established that defendant was
the person on the document) (citing State v. Hurley, 741 P.2d 257, 265 (1987)).
251

State v. Molina, 118 P.3d 1094, 1101 (Ariz. App. 2005); Carreon, 107 P.3d at 919-20.

252

Aleman, 109 P.3d at 580.

253

Carreon, 107 P.3d at 919-20 (Blakely-exempt factors are even sufficient to uphold a death

sentence).
254

State v. Estrada 108 P.3d 261, 267 (Ariz. App. 2005) “The existence of a single Blakely-

compliant or . . . Blakely-exempt aggravating factor raises the sentencing ceiling to the
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Even though Arizona’s sentencing provisions set forth a sentencing range, the legislature
bifurcated the responsibility for finding aggravating factors between the jury, which must find at
least one aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt, and the judge, who may then find
additional aggravating factors by a preponderance of the evidence.255 Once the jury makes the
initial fact-finding, establishing the verdict and sentencing range, the Sixth Amendment is
satisfied so long as the judge imposes a punishment within the authorized range. By separating
the aggravator fact-finding roles of the judge and the jury, the Arizona sentencing scheme
complied with the Apprendi progeny because it curtailed judicial discretion and preserved the
Sixth Amendment guarantee of having a jury find all facts legally essential to a defendant’s
punishment. Thus, Arizona’s sentencing scheme is not in constitutional jeopardy, it complies
with the United States Supreme Court Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, and is safely out of the
path of the Sixth Amendment rollercoaster.
Furthermore, Arizona’s sentencing provisions dictate how many aggravators are required to
sustain a particular enhanced sentence.256 The presumptive sentencing scheme comports with
legislatively prescribed maximum, thereby permitting (indeed, requiring pursuant to § 13-702)
judicial fact-finding in noncapital cases without violating Blakely.” Id.
255

See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-702.01 (Supp. 2000), amended by ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §

13-702.01 (2005).
256

See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-702 (Supp. 2000), amended by ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-

702 (2005); State v. Henderson, 115 P.3d 601, 609 (Ariz. 2005) (requiring finding of two
aggravators for super-aggravated sentence); State v. Martinez,115 P.3d 618, 624 (Ariz. 2005)
(increase from presumptive to maximum sentence permissible upon finding of one or more
aggravating factors).
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Blakely because the judge’s role as a fact-finder is only relevant once the jury explicitly or
implicitly finds an aggravating factor, the defendant admits to an aggravating factor, or the
defendant has a prior conviction.257 Arizona’s sentencing scheme controls judicial discretion and
maintains sentencing uniformity and predictability by only allowing judges to increase sentences
within the authorized statutorily permissible range.258 Therefore, when a judge aggravates a
sentence, like the trial judge in Martinez, the aggravated sentence is justified so long as it
comports with Blakely and the Apprendi progeny.259 On the other hand, the sentence will not be

257

See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 299-300 (2004); Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. 224,

226-27 (1998); Martinez, 115 P.3d at 624; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-702(A), (C) (Supp.
2000), amended by ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-702(A), (C) (2005).
258

See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-702 (Supp. 2000), amended by ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-

702 (2005). The consideration of any additional aggravating circumstance, while still relevant to
the determination of the specific sentence within the aggravated range, becomes irrelevant to the
threshold determination of whether an aggravated sentence is permissible under Sixth
Amendment standards. See Martinez, 115 P.3d at 624; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-702 (Supp.
2000), amended by ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-702 (2005); supra notes 113 and 202.
259

See Martinez, 115 P.3d at 623, 625-26. Applying Henderson to Martinez II, it is unlikely that

a reasonable jury would fail to find the aggravating factor of “infliction or threatened infliction
of serious physical harm” and therefore Martinez was not prejudiced by the sentence and
fundamental error did not occur. See id. at 620 (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-702(C)
(Supp. 2000), amended by ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-702(C) (2005)). See also State v. Gomez
123 P.3d 1131, 1139 (Ariz. 2005) (sentencing defendant to aggravated term for sexual assault
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upheld, as in Henderson, when the judge finds aggravating facts under the preponderance of the
evidence standard and uses those facts to increase the sentence beyond that authorized by the
jury’s verdict.260
While Arizona’s presumptive sentencing scheme complied with the Apprendi progeny,
other presumptive sentencing schemes, such as Indiana’s,261 clashed in a similar fashion as did
Washington’s presumptive guidelines. Unlike Arizona’s scheme, Indiana’s scheme required the
judge to consider aggravating factors on her own and only after she found and articulated those
factors, could she depart from the fixed term.262 Indiana’s scheme violated the Sixth Amendment
because it mandated a fixed term, which was the functional equivalent of Washington’s standard
range, and then permitted the judge to find aggravators and use her discretion to depart from the
fixed term based on her findings.263
By allowing the judge to find aggravating factors, Indiana deprived defendants of their
inalienable right to have a jury decide the facts legally essential to their punishment. Rather than
abandon and sever the fixed term requirement from Indiana’s scheme, the Indiana Supreme
Court decided to keep fixed term sentencing and require jury fact-finding of aggravators in order

did not violate Blakely because jury’s finding of dangerousness established the serious physical
injury aggravating factor necessary to justify an aggravated term).
260

See Henderson, 115 P.3d at 610.

261

See supra note 56.

262

See supra note 56.

263

Smylie v. State, 823 N.E.2d 679, 685-86 (Ind. 2005) (reversed and remanded for sentencing

with jury considering aggravating factors).
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to comply with Blakely.264 Shortly thereafter, Indiana’s legislature took further measures to
modify their fixed term requirement by changing their presumptive sentencing language to make
their scheme advisory.265 Now, both Indiana and Arizona’s schemes comply with the Apprendi
progeny and are safely off the tracks of the Sixth Amendment rollercoaster.
IV.

The Burdens and Benefits of Blakely and Martinez
A. Are Bifurcated Trials Necessary?

In response to Blakely challenges and the need to preserve defendants’ Sixth Amendment
rights, Arizona now conducts bifurcated trials in some cases.266 In cases involving aggravating
factors, an aggravation phase will always follow the guilt phase and come before the sentencing
or penalty phase.267 However, after a jury convicts a defendant in the normal guilt phase of a
trial, the trial court may conduct a separate Blakely “mini trial.”268 While Arizona’s sentencing
scheme requires the trial court to consider aggravating and mitigating factors prior to
determining a sentence, a separate jury trial is not mandatory, nor does a defendant have the right

264

Id. at 687.

265

See Michael Limrick, Senate Bill 96: How General Assembly Returned Problem of Uniform

Sentencing to Indiana’s Appellate Courts, 49-FEB Res Gestae 18 *22 (2006) (amended to read
as the court “may voluntarily consider”); Smylie, 823 N.E.2d at 687 (maintaining and modifying
was more favorable to Indiana’s legislative intent and goals of sentencing reform).
266

See State v. Urquidez, 2006 WL 233431 (Ariz. App. 2006).

267

See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (Supp. 2000), amended by ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-

703 (2005).
268

Urquidez, 2006 WL 233431, at *4.
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to a separate trial.269 A Blakely “mini trial” is a separate second jury trial solely for the purpose
of determining aggravating facts. It is an additional constitutional protection, however it has the
potential to add an unnecessary burden to an already overworked criminal justice system.270
A second separate jury trial to determine aggravating factors will burden the criminal
justice system in both a financial and a temporal manner.271 While protecting a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right is as valid and worthy a cause as one might encounter in American courts, a
separate jury trial as of right will only amount to increased inefficiency and a waste of resources.
As Justice Breyer indicated in his dissent in Blakely v. Washington, “[i]n the context of
noncapital crimes, the potential need for a second indictment alleging aggravating facts, the
likely need for formal evidentiary rules to prevent prejudice, and the increased difficulty of
obtaining relevant sentencing information, all will mean greater complexity, added cost, and
further delay.”272

269

“[T]here is no Sixth Amendment right to jury sentencing, even where the sentence turns on

specific findings of fact.” McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 93 (1986). See also ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-702 (Supp. 2000), amended by ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-702 (2005);
88 C.J.S. Trial § 18 (2005) (explaining that a trial court has the power and discretion to bifurcate
a trial on a case-by-case basis).
270

See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 335-38 (2004) (Breyer, dissenting).

271

See id.; Urquidez, 2006 WL 233431, at *4.

272

Blakely, 542 U.S. at 336 (Breyer, dissenting).
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In all “run-of-the-mill”273 cases, the trial court should deal with aggravators at the
completion of the guilt phase, thus complying with Arizona’s sentencing scheme, and the same
jury should evaluate their merit.274 By using the same jury, the state will not have to go through
the unnecessary burden of enlisting a new jury, to whom the prosecutor and defense counsel will
have to re-explain the facts and possibly complex history of the case.275 Once a jury sits through
an entire trial, in which they hear from the prosecution, defense counsel, the witnesses, the judge,
and possibly the defendant, it makes absolutely no sense to excuse them from deciding what
273

Id. All non-capital cases are considered “run-of-the-mill” because they require much less time

and money than capital cases involving a guilt phase and mandatory penalty phase in which a
defendant can spend almost unlimited time and resources. See Alex Kozinski & Sean Gallagher,
Death: The Ultimate Run on Sentence, 46 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1, 11-16 (1995) (citing one case
in which a defendant took over two weeks to explain his life story as a mitigating circumstance).
Additionally, in California it costs over $90,000,000 a year for death penalty cases, equally over
$200,000 per year per defendant. Id. at 13-14.
274

There is no language in Arizona’s sentencing provisions allowing a defendant to demand a

new jury to hear and decide aggravating factors. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-702, -703.01
(Supp. 2000), amended by ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-702, -703.01 (2005). In fact, § 13-702
only requires that the trier of fact determine and the court consider the aggravating
circumstances. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-702 (Supp. 2000), amended by ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-702 (2005).
275

See State v. Anderson, 111 P.3d 369, 389 (Ariz. 2005) (aggravation phase jury must consider

evidence from guilt phase and state must present all evidence it wishes to be considered in
aggravation); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703.01(E) (Supp. 2000).
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facts are aggravating and which are mitigating. To do so would be a waste of the taxpayers’
money, the prosecution, defense counsel, and jury’s time, and the judge’s accessibility.276
Additionally, the defendant will not be deprived of the aggravation phase of trial, but rather is
not being awarded the opportunity to have a second jury determine potential aggravating factors.
While the defendant has a constitutional right to have the jury decide all facts that are
legally essential to his punishment, the jury need not explicitly find all facts that will be
considered in his punishment.277 Some facts will automatically be considered as aggravators
simply because they are implicit in the jury’s verdict.278 For instance, if a defendant shoots and
kills his eighty year old step-father and the jury convicts the defendant for murder, then even if
not explicitly stated, it is implicit in the jury’s verdict that the murder victim died and the victim
was over the age of sixty-five.279 Both of those facts are aggravating factors under Arizona
276

See Anderson, 111 P.3d at 390 (“aggravation and penalty phases were essentially a full-blown

re-presentation of the entire case. Nearly every trial exhibit was admitted” and almost every
witness re-testified).
277

U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see supra Parts I.A, II.C.2.

278

See State v. Urquidez, 2006 WL 233431, *4 (Ariz. App. 2006); Anderson, 111 P.3d at 1221

(jury convicted defendant of three counts of murder which established beyond a reasonable
doubt the aggravator of serious physical injury); State v. Martinez, 118 P.3d 618, 619 (Ariz.
2005) (jury convicted defendant of murder of sixty-nine year old landlord, which established
beyond a reasonable doubt the aggravators of severe injury or death and victim’s age over sixtyfive).
279

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-702 (C)(9), (13) (Supp. 2000), amended by ARIZ. REV. STAT.

ANN. §§ 13-702(C)(9), (13) (2005).
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sentencing provisions and will be used to aggravate the sentence, so long as no mitigating
circumstances preclude aggravation.280 It would be a complete waste of the trial court’s time and
taxpayers’ money to hold a Blakely “mini trial,” even with the same jury, because these Blakelycompliant281 aggravating factors are undisputable and no reasonable jury would fail to find those
factors. Likewise, it is unnecessary to hold a Blakely “mini trial” on prior convictions because
they are Blakely-exempt and need only be supported by reasonable evidence in the record.282
Thus, once a prior conviction or Blakely-compliant factor is established, a defendant has no
constitutional right to jury findings on additional aggravating factors because they are not legally
essential to his punishment and it is up to the judge to decide where the sentence falls within the
permissible range.283 Accordingly, only in rare cases should the court conduct a Blakely “mini
trial” in order to further protect a defendant’s procedural rights. In capital cases where the death
penalty is at stake, enlisting a separate jury to determine aggravating factors is certainly not a
waste of time or money. When a defendant’s mortal life is at stake, the utmost available
protection is required. Otherwise, for “run-of-the-mill” cases in which the aggravation door is
not already open, the aggravating phase that follows the guilt phase is sufficient to ensure that
the jury has the opportunity to find all facts legally essential to the defendant’s punishment.
B. Judicial Discretion

280

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-702 (C)(9), (13) (Supp. 2000), amended by ARIZ. REV. STAT.

ANN. §§ 13-702(C)(9), (13) (2005).
281

See supra notes 245 and 247.
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See supra text accompanying note 249.

283

State v. Estrada, 108 P.3d 261, 264 (Ariz. App. 2005); see supra note 290.
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The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a criminal
defendant’s right to a trial by jury. That right continues through sentencing. The
Sixth Amendment, however, does not remove from a trial judge the traditional
sentencing discretion afforded the judge, so long as the judge exercises that
discretion within a sentencing range established by the fact of a prior conviction,
facts found by a jury, or facts admitted by a defendant.284
The United States Supreme Court Sixth Amendment jurisprudence has made clear that
the “jury requirement does not entirely remove from the purview of judges any consideration of
aggravating factors.”285 Likewise, Martinez does not expand judicial discretion, but rather
complies with the Apprendi progeny and enunciates the permissible boundaries within Arizona’s
sentencing scheme.
The recently amended sentencing provisions applied in Martinez II permit Arizona
judges to use their discretion during the aggravation and penalty phases, so long as they stay
within the authorized sentencing range.286 In most situations, the judge is required to at least
consider aggravating factors, however she need not impose an aggravated sentence.287 Therefore,
the judge may use her discretion when balancing aggravating and mitigating circumstances
because she is only allowed to consider those circumstances after all facts legally essential to the

284

State v. Carreon, 116 P.3d 1192, 1193 (Ariz. 2005).

285

State v. Martinez, 115 P.3d 618, 621 (Ariz. 2005). When “[t]he judge performs sentencing in

a non-capital case, [it] is not a fact-finding function. Instead, it is an exercise of discretion.” State
v. Munninger, 104 P.3d 204, 211 (Ariz. App. 2005).
286

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-702 (B), (C) (Supp. 2000), amended by ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.

§§ 13-702 (B), (C) (2005).
287

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-702 (C)(11) (2001).
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punishment have already been determined.288 Only when the judge finds one or more
aggravating circumstances and no mitigators, is her judicial discretion curtailed. In that situation,
the judge is statutorily required to impose an aggravated sentence and may not depart from the
sentencing provisions recommendations.289
Furthermore, “[w]hen a trial judge exercises his discretion to select a specific sentence
within a defined range, the defendant has no right to a jury determination of the facts that the
judge deems relevant.”290 Although the defendant has no constitutional right to jury fact-finding
at this stage, his rights are still protected against a tyrannical abuse of judicial power. The judge
must articulate which factors she found and used to aggravate the sentence.291 Thus, if a case is
appealed, the reviewing court will have an on the record account of what factors affected the
defendant’s sentence. Absent this safeguard, unfettered judicial discretion could lead to an
erosion of the guarantees provided by the Sixth Amendment and Arizona would be back on the
Sixth Amendment’s rollercoaster tracks.
While judicial discretion needs to be restrained, it is also a necessary component of the
criminal justice system. The judge’s role in sentencing is to sufficiently punish the defendant for
criminal wrongdoing.292 If the judge had no discretion in this stage of the proceedings, then all
288

See supra text accompanying notes 245 and 254.

289

State v. Estrada, 108 P.3d 261, 264 (Ariz. App. 2005) (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 13-702

(D)(5)).
290

State v. Manzanado, 110 P.3d 1026, 1031 (Ariz. App. 2005) (quoting United States v.

Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233 (2005)) (internal quotations omitted).
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See supra text accompanying note 59.

292

See supra text accompanying notes 33-34.
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defendants who commit the same type of crime will be punished in exactly the same manner,
regardless of the factual circumstances surrounding the crime. Discretion is absolutely necessary
to equitably punish defendants for their specific criminal conduct.293 Some situations will merit
leniency, while others may demand the most severe punishment available. It is essential that
judges have some leeway to protect the public from further crimes and to deter future criminal
conduct. Again, abuse of judicial discretion will be restricted by statutes and by the appeals
process. Moreover, the judge is in the best position to further the goals of sentencing reform, and
discretion must be allowed for the judge to sufficiently and equitably punish defendants for their
wrongdoing.294
Conclusion
The Sixth Amendment acts as a moat around the sacrosanct jury trial and prevents a
possible tyrannical government from tainting our ability to have our peers and neighbors decide
our fate in criminal matters. The United States Supreme Court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence
sheds light into the depth of the moat and lowers an occasional drawbridge clarifying how sacred
the right to jury trial truly is.
One clear constitutional principle to which all federal and state sentencing schemes must
adhere, is that all facts legally essential to a defendant’s punishment must be submitted to a jury
and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.295 The classification of facts and circumstances as factors
or elements is irrelevant if their presence increases a defendant’s possible punishment.296
293

See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.

294

See supra note 34.
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See supra notes 26, 126, 205 and accompanying text.
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See supra note 86.
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Anything that can enhance a defendant’s sentencing range must be admitted by the defendant,
found by a jury, or satisfy Blakely.297
The United States Supreme Court clarified that sentence aggravation is distinguishable
from enhancement and only the latter requires additional jury findings. However, a defendant
does not have a constitutional right to have a jury find all aggravating factors when they are not
all legally essential to the defendant’s punishment.298 The aggravation phase of a trial follows the
guilt phase and the guilt phase is where the facts legally essential to punishment must be
determined. The jury’s verdict is a telltale sign of what a defendant’s maximum punishment can
be. Judicial discretion only comes into play after the maximum sentencing range is established.
Thus, judicial discretion within an authorized sentencing range is permissible and
warranted when Blakely is satisfied and the facts demand additional punishment.299 Judicial
discretion is not open ended, but rather clearly defined by both the United States Supreme
Court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence and Arizona statutory and case law.300 Judicial
discretion does not jeopardize the goals of sentencing uniformity and predictability, but rather
clarifies them. Judges are able to use the specific facts involved in a crime and cater the
punishment to those facts. By recording their justifications for aggravation, judges constantly
supply notice to potential criminals and to legislators, who may amend sentencing provisions if
they feel judges are drifting from the legislature’s sentencing goals.
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See supra Part III.B.
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See supra note 290.
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See supra notes 286-289 and accompanying text.
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See supra Part IV.B.
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These Sixth Amendment interpretation twists and turns, applied to Arizona’s sentencing
scheme and cases such as State v. Martinez, produce carefully crafted boundaries to judicial
discretion and the inalienable right to trial by jury. Accordingly, Arizona’s current status with
aggravator fact-finding complies with the Apprendi progeny because once the jury finds the
initial aggravating factors, the Sixth Amendment is satisfied and the judge may consider
additional aggravators during sentencing, so long as the sentence remains within the range
authorized by the jury’s verdict. Therefore, Arizona’s presumptive sentencing scheme is safely
off the tracks of the Sixth Amendment rollercoaster. Nevertheless, the United States Supreme
Court may lower another drawbridge, and if so, Arizona may have to rework its’ sentencing
provisions so that criminal defendants’ constitutional guarantees are not under siege.
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